Education Background
Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University
M.A. in Planning and Management, Renmin University of China
B.S. in Mechanics, Peking University
Research Field
Biography
Lixin Ye earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 2001, and was subsequently appointed as an Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, and Full Professor in Economics at The Ohio State University. He is currently Professor of Economics and SFI Chair Professor at the School of Economics and Management at CUHK Shenzhen. He is also serving as the Director of the MPhil-Ph.D. Program in Economics at SME. His main research interests are in Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, Industrial Organization, and Contract Theory. His current research focuses on dynamic auctions and nonlinear pricing.
1. “Note on Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for Assembly,” with Xi Shan and Chenglin Zhang, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2024, 26(6): 2231-2236.
2. “Orchestrating Information Acquisition,” with Jingfeng Lu and Xin Feng, American Economic Journals: Microeconomics 2021, 13(4): 420–465.
3. “Collusion through Coordination on Announcements,” with Joseph E. Harrington, Journal of Industrial Economics 2019, 6: 209-241.
4. “Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Radio Spectrum Sharing,” with Chenglin Zhang, Christopher Baker, Joel Johnson, and Huaiyi Wang, International Journal of Industrial Organization 2018,60: 206–227.
5. “Monopolistic Nonlinear Pricing with Consumer Entry,” with Chenglin Zhang, Theoretical Economics 2017, 12: 141–173.
6. “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety,” with Jian Shen and Huanxing Yang, Journal of Industrial Economics 2016, 64(1): 64-108.
7. “Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities,” with Youxin Hu, John Kagel, and Xiaoshu Xu, Games and Economic Behavior 2013,82: 269-291.
8. “Auctions with Entry and Resale,” with Xiaoshu Xu and Dan Levin, Games and Economic Behavior 2013,79: 92-105.
9. “Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Private Information Acquisition Costs,” with Jingfeng Lu, Journal of Economic Theory 2013,148 (1): 393-408.
10. “Auctions with Synergy and Resale,” with Xiaoshu Xu and Dan Levin, International Journal of Game Theory 2012,41 (2): 397-426.
11. “Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice,” with Massimo Morelli and Huanxing Yang, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2012, 4(1): 142-175.
12. “Quality Disclosure and Competition,” with Dan Levin and James Peck, Journal of Industrial Economics 2009, 57 (1): 167-196.
13. “Nonlinear Pricing, Market Coverage, and Competition,” with Huanxing Yang, Theoretical Economics 2008, 3: 123-153.
14. “Search with Learning: Understanding Asymmetric Price Adjustments,” with Huanxing Yang, The RAND Journal of Economics 2008, 39: 547-564.
15. “Hybrid Auctions Revisited,” with Dan Levin, Economics Letters 2008, 99: 591-594.
16. “Trademark Sales, Entry, and the Value of Reputation,” with Howard Marvel, International Economic Review 2008, 49: 547-576.
17. “Indicative Bidding: An Experimental Analysis,” with John Kagel and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Games and Economic Behavior 2008, 62: 697-721.
18. “Survival Auctions,” with John Kagel and Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Economic Theory 2007, 33: 103-119.
19. “Reserve Price Signaling,” with Hongbin Cai and John Riley, Journal of Economic Theory 2007, 135 (1): 253-268.
20. “Bad News Can Be Good News: Early Dropouts in an English Auction with Multi-dimensional Signals,” with Dan Levin and James Peck, Economic Letters 2007, 95: 462-467.
21. “Indicative Bidding and A Theory of Two-Stage Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior 2007, 58 (1): 181-207.
22. “On the Use of Customized vs. Standardized Performance Measures,” with Anil Arya, Jonathan Glover, and Brian Mitterdorf, Journal of Management Accounting Research 2005,17: 7-21.
23. “Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry,” Contributions to Theoretical Economics 2004, 4(1): Article 8, 1-27.
24. “Deciding Between Competition and Collusion,” with Patrick Bajari, Review of Economics and Statistics 2003, 85(4): 971-989.
