| Abstract: |
Do directors’ dissenting votes increase or increase a declining firm’s chance of performance turnaround? We propose a negative effect of director dissent on firm performance turnaround because such dissent burdens managers with excess stress. Furthermore, this effect of director dissent would be strengthened by dissenting directors’ power but weakened by managers’ past experience with organizational declines. Analyzing data on Chinese listed firms, we find support for our predictions. In addition, a complementary analysis corroborates the mediating role of managerial stress on the main relationship.
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Biography:
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Before joining HKUST(GZ), Prof. He worked at Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship of CEIBS and Department of Management of HKUST respectively. His research interests focus on Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability, and Competitive Dynamics. His publications have appeared in leading academic journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management, etc. He had served on the editorial boards of Academy of Management Review and Journal of Management. He is currently a senior editor for Management and Organization Review.
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