买方垄断与后置型薪酬：基于公共会计师的理论与实证
发布时间：2026-09-28
9月
29
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时间和日期
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2026-09-29 (星期二) 01:30 上午
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12:00 下午
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| 标题 | 买方垄断与后置型薪酬：基于公共会计师的理论与实证 |
| 日期和时间 |
2026年9月29日（周二） 10:30-12:00 |
| 地点 | 综合教学楼D904会议室 |
| 主讲人 | Bernardo S. Silveira, 苏黎世大学 |
| 摘要 | In monopsony models, wage markdowns induce deadweight loss and are therefore inefficient. Yet markdowns also arise in models with backloaded efficiency pay, where they are designed to induce effort among early-career workers and are thus efficient. To reconcile---and empirically distinguish---these two mechanisms, we build a dynamic model incorporating labor market power and endogenous effort. Estimating a team production model on novel data on U.S. public accounting firms, we find evidence of both: markdowns for junior workers and markups for senior ones reflect incentive-providing backloading, while monopsony power induces a 'lifetime' wage markdown of 15%. |
| 主讲人简介 | Bernardo S. Silveira 现任苏黎世大学教授，曾任加州大学洛杉矶分校助理教授。他的研究领域包括应用微观经济学、法律经济学、政治经济学和产业组织理论。其研究成果发表于Econometrica、Journal of Political Economy和Review of Economic Studies等国际顶级经济学期刊。 |
