| Abstract: |
The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools provides powerful resources for content creators in the content creation process. However, they also introduce challenges, as creators may delegate tasks excessively to AI for cost reasons. This paper presents a game-theoretic model to explore the wage strategies for a platform to incentivize content creators in such scenarios. Our model reveals that, for a representative human creator, if delegation effectively enhances overall output, the platform should reduce the wage level, as AI can partially replace the human creator. Conversely, if delegation does not sufficiently improve overall output, the platform should increase the wage level to encourage human efforts on tasks that AI struggles with. Furthermore, we show that the introduction of strong AI tools could be detrimental to the platform, as it may cause the human creator to excessively shirk effort, which can no longer be amendable by increasing the wage level. Interestingly, if the platform can adjust the AI strength endogenously, the optimal wage level remains the same as in the no-AI scenario. This finding greatly simplifies the platform's wage decisions in the AI era.
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Biography:
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Dr. Yifan Dou is a professor of information systems and business intelligence at School of Management, Fudan University. He obtained both his bachelor's and doctoral degrees from the School of Economics and Management at Tsinghua University. Dr. Dou's research focuses on the application of game-theoretical models to explore emerging topics in e-business, digital platforms, and the economics of digital goods and services. He is currently an associate editor for Management Science and Information Systems Research.
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