金钱激励还是监督管理：提高员工努力程度的实证研究
发布时间：2025-06-10
6月
11
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时间和日期
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2025-06-11 (星期三) 10:30 上午
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12:00 下午
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| 标题: | 金钱激励还是监督管理：提高员工努力程度的实证研究 |
| 日期和时间: |
2025年6月11日（周三） 10:30-12:00 |
| 地点 | 综合教学楼D202阶梯教室 |
| 主讲人: |
蔡婧教授 马里兰大学 |
| 摘要: | Higher compensation and increased monitoring are two common strategies for ad- dressing the moral hazard problem between firms and workers. In a field experiment with new hires at an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we randomly varied both signing bonuses and monitoring intensity. Both interventions increased worker output but through different channels: signing bonuses led to longer working hours without significant gains in performance, while enhanced monitoring improved performance as evaluated by managers. Additionally, bonuses reduced quit rates, whereas monitoring raised them. These results suggest that firms should carefully consider their primary objectives and weigh these trade-offs when designing optimal labor contracts. |
| 主讲人简介: | 蔡婧是马里兰大学的副教授。她于2012年在加州大学伯克利分校获得博士学位。她的研究领域为发展经济学和家庭金融。她当前的研究主要关注微型企业和中小企业的成长、税收激励对企业行为的影响，以及金融创新在发展中国家的传播及其影响。蔡博士现任Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) 企业发展中心的联合主席、National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)的研究员，并担任Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD)的研究员。她目前还担任《American Economic Journal: Applied Economics》，《Journal of Development Economics》及《Economic Development and Cultural Change》三本期刊的副主编。 |
