风险承担激励和股票收益中的行为扭曲
发布时间：2025-07-02
7月
03
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时间和日期
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2025-07-03 (星期四) 01:30 上午
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12:00 下午
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| 标题: | 风险承担激励和股票收益中的行为扭曲 |
| 日期和时间: |
2025年7月3日（周四） 10:30-12:00 |
| 地点 | 综合教学楼D202阶梯教室 |
| 主讲人: |
Stephanie Dong 罗切斯特大学 |
| 摘要: | Prospect theory suggests that when agents experience prior losses, they make suboptimal decisions in an attempt to recoup their losses. We investigate whether the stock market efficiently impounds the distortions to executives’ option-based risk-taking incentives that occur when their firms have prior losses. We find that loss firms whose managers have high option-based vega subsequently have abnormally low stock returns, higher crash risk, deteriorating profitability, and are prone to corporate overinvestment. Our results provide some of the first empirical evidence that investors do not anticipate the distortive effects of behavioral biases on traditional equity-based compensation incentives. |
| 主讲人简介: | Stephanie教授于2024 年获得纽约大学斯特恩商学院会计学博士学位，并曾担任罗切斯特大学客座教授。她的研究兴趣广泛，涵盖财务披露、风险和资本市场。她研究的主题包括风险披露的决定因素和后果、风险承担、高管薪酬以及区块链/加密货币。 |
