具有探索特征的稳健合约
发布时间：2025-09-02
9月
05
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时间和日期
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2025-09-05 (星期五) 14:00 下午
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15:30 下午
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地点
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综合教学楼D904会议室
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| 标题 | 具有探索特征的稳健合约 |
| 日期和时间 |
2025年9月5日（周五） 14:00-15:30 |
| 地点 | 综合教学楼D904会议室 |
| 主讲人 |
刘畅教授 新南威尔士大学 |
| 摘要 | We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs, where the worst case is over the possible action sets. The principal observes the action chosen by the first agent, and then offers a new contract to the second agent based on this knowledge, thus having the opportunity to explore in the first period. We introduce and compare three different notions of dynamic worst-case considerations. Within each notion, we define a suitable rule of updating and characterize the principal's optimal payoff guarantee. We find that linear contracts are robustly optimal not only in static settings, but also in dynamic environments with exploration. |
| 主讲人简介 | 刘畅是新南威尔士大学商学院的经济学讲师。他的学术研究集中于微观经济学的纯理论与应用理论，尤其关注动态因素显著的环境下的均衡行为和机制设计。在加入新南威尔士大学之前，他曾任西蒙斯劳弗数学科学研究所（SLMath，前身为MSRI）博士后研究员。他拥有哈佛大学经济学博士学位。 |
