知情的代价: 市场出清中的竞争与搜索摩擦
发布时间：2026-03-03
3月
06
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时间和日期
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2026-03-06 (星期五) 10:30 上午
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12:00 下午
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| 标题 | 知情的代价: 市场出清中的竞争与搜索摩擦 |
| 日期和时间 | 2026年3月6日（周五） 10:30-12:00 |
| 地点 | 综合教学楼D504会议室 |
| 主讲人 | 谢颖康教授 圣路易斯华盛顿大学 |
| 摘要 | Making information available is often expected to facilitate market clearing. We test this hypothesis using a field experiment on a digital shipping platform by randomizing whether truck drivers observe the current best rival bid when competing for shipment jobs. Revealing competitor prices intensifies price competition. Shipment jobs are more likely to clear either at the posted take-it-now price or at lower negotiated prices. However, contrary to standard efficiency intuition, intensified competition does not increase the volume of successful matches when price drops, but rather slows down the overall market clearing. Drivers are more likely to click away from jobs to avoid competition rather than being nudged to use take-it-now to secure a job. Instead, they reallocate their effort from negotiation toward extensive search, effectively substituting haggling for checking alternative job opportunities. Drivers expand their consideration sets substantially, but matches are not only delayed but cancelled more often. Further analysis reveals a boundary condition that information backfires only when driver supply far exceeds demand; conversely, in less congested markets, showing real-time competition improves job coordination. Our results show that making information available does not necessarily accelerate market clearing: although transparency can reduce bargaining frictions in price discovery, it also induces costly search that offsets its intended efficiency gains. |
| 主讲人简介 | 谢教授的研究聚焦于平台在定价、信息披露、以及渠道管理方面所面临的挑战。他于 2023 年获得西北大学凯洛格管理学院市场营销学博士学位，并在市场营销期刊 Journal of Marketing Research 发表论文。其研究成果曾荣获美国统计学会（American Statistical Association）颁发的2023年博士研究奖最佳论文奖。谢教授此前曾是 Credit Karma首位数据科学家，负责从零开始搭建类拍卖的广告投放系统。他还曾在 Adobe 和 Facebook 工作，参与多个与数字营销中广告主行为及广告效果相关的项目。 |
